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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
sufficient bases to warrant such an interpretation and such a
finding by the court. The trouble here seems to have been that,
in the opinion of the majority, there was no room for any other
interpretation of the testator's intention.
PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
J. Denson Smith*
Although where a sale is made pursuant to an option previ-
ously granted the value of the property in an action of lesion
beyond moiety is to be determined as of the date of the option,'
the four-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date of
the sale.2 These provisions were applied in Fletcher v. Smith.8
The court also held that in determining the value of the property
it is proper to consider its highest and best use as is done in cases
involving expropriation. It reached this conclusion after review-
ing the opinion of the Supreme Court in Armwood v. Kennedy,
4
which stated that the "highest and best use" rule is not appli-
cable to the problem of lesion. The question posed is being con-
sidered for discussion in a later issue of this Review.
An effort by an automobile dealer to claim protection against
the sale of a defective car by virtue of a so-called manufacturer's
warranty plus a signed "check list" which purported to contain
an acceptance of the car as in satisfactory condition and an ac-
knowledgment that future adjustments would be made only under
the terms of the warranty was rejected by the court in Stumpf v.
Metairie Motor Sales, Inc.5 Earlier cases involving this kind of
problem are generally in accord and constitute a recognition that
such limitations of liability are not the result of actual bargaining
and should not be given literal effect. The evidence that the car
was so defective that the buyer would not have bought it if its
true condition had been known to him was clear and convincing.
In Faust v. Pelican Plumbing Supply, Inc.,6 the plaintiff
brought an action in redhibition claiming a return of the pur-
chase price plus expenses against (1) his own vendor, (2) the
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIv. CODs art. 2590.
2. Id. art. 2595.
3. 216 So.2d 663 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
4. 231 La. 102, 90 So.2d 793 (1956).
5. 212 So.2d 705 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
6. 215 So.2d 373 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
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latter's vendor, who was a local distributor, and (3) the manu-
facturer of a steam bath unit. His actions against the seller and
the distributor were dismissed by the trial court and he was
given judgment against the manufacturer. He appealed inasmuch
as the judgment dismissed his action against the seller and the
distributor. It was held on appeal that plaintiff's suit against the
seller should not have been dismissed. The dismissal in favor of
the distributor was upheld on the ground of lack of privity. Not
considered was the propriety of the judgment against the manu-
facturer since this defendant had made no appearance at any
time in the suit. Inasmuch as the seller had bought the unit from
the distributor it would appear that the plaintiff acquired by way
of tacit assignment the seller's right against the distributor,7 but
this contention was apparently not presented to the court. From
this point of view, privity is not the issue although a question
does arise concerning whether the buyer may sue both his vendor
and his vendor's vendor.8
TORTS
William E. Crawford*
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Grant v. Touro Infirmary'
correctly held a surgeon negligent for his failure to remove a
sponge from an incision before closing it. The general rule ac-
cording to Corpus Juris Secundum,2 classifying the failure as
negligence per se, was cited with approval.
The court also held that the surgeon and the hospital had
a division of control over the nurses attending the operation and
assisting with it; hence, the borrowed servant rule did not apply.
The conduct of the nurses was material because a nurse's failure
to count sponges correctly during the operation was clearly negli-
gent.
The precise nature of the nurse's function was also important
on the overpowering issue of whether Touro's liability insurance
carrier had correctly denied coverage and refused to defend in
reliance on the clauses in the policy excluding coverage for the
7. See McEachern v. Plauche Lumber & Const. Co., 220 La. 696, 57 So.2d
405 (1952); POTHIER, CONTRAT DE VENTE nos 215-16 (Bugnet ed. 1861).
8. Id.
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